Category: What do you think?

Sarah Palin says on twitter:

Mr. President, why are they so set on marking an area w/ mosque steps from what you described, in agreement with many, as “hallowed ground”?

Will Obama express US lingering pain& ask Muslims for tolerance by discouraging 9/11 mosque while he celebrates Islamic holy month tonight?

Mr. President, should they or shouldn’t they build a Muslim mosque steps away from where radical Islamists killed 3000 people?Your position?

American Response:

@SarahPalinUSA Don’t equate All Muslims with those 9/11 terrorist, you are doing their work by opposing the freedom of religion.
Muslims are also victims of terrorism and they have lost their lives on 9/11 as well. Please read this article:
http://islam.about.com/blvictims.htm

An organization of German Jews that wants to send an aid ship to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza says that its intentions are no betrayal of the Jewish people.

In an interview with the German Press Agency dpa in Berlin, Kate Katzenstein-Leiterer, a leader of the German Jewish Voice organization said instead that they wanted to help preserve the state of Israel by showing that its current policies were wrong.
Israeli forces approaching Gaza flotilla

Israel Navy forces approach one of six ships of an aid flotilla bound for Gaza on May 31, 2010.

“We want Israel to behave in a way that it can be recognized as a democratic state. Now it is recognized as a criminal state. That is not what we want,” she said.

On May 31 nine people were killed when Israeli naval forces boarded ships in a flotilla carrying aid and activists – some of whom Israel says were armed – bound for the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

The event caused international outrage, and has prompted Iran to say it will send its own fleet, threatening more confrontation in the Mediterranean.

“Some see what we are doing as a betrayal. But the question is, what do they really know about the whole thing. Some people don’t want to be educated,” Katzenstein-Leiterer said.

Jewish Voice plans to fill at least one vessel with educational materials donated by German schoolchildren for Gazan kids, and sail it from a Mediterranean port in mid-July.

“We don’t want any confrontation with the Israeli navy. We have informed the (Israeli) ambassador in Berlin, and if they find it necessary to stop and check us, we will let them do that.”

“And when they don’t find any material that could be a security risk, we want them to let us go into Gaza. We won’t unload our cargo in any Israeli or Egyptian port,” she says.

Katzenstein-Leiterer grew up in the former East Germany, to where her committed Communist parents returned after fleeing Hitler’s regime in World War II.

Her organization is part of the European Jews for a Just Peace movement, a ten-country peace-activist network.

Jewish Voice in Germany says that it has gathered the funds for its aid ship project from personal donations, loans, and a donation from the Left Party, a small political grouping with strong support in the former East.

“Normal people here don’t understand very much what is going on in Israel and Palestine,” Katzenstein-Leiterer says.

“The German press doesn’t show what is going on. People think all Gazans are terrorists, like West Germans used to think that all East Germans were informers for the Stasi (secret police).

Katzenstein-Leiterer says that her group’s stance has caused them to be ostracized by the mainstream German-Jewish community, which numbers a little over 100,000.
“Most of the Jews in Germany are immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and they are not on our side. The other members of the community are not on our side either. They say that everything that Israel does is OK, and they close their eyes to what is going on.”

A senior activist in the Jewish Voice movement, Rolf Verleger, was reportedly expelled from his position in the Central Council of Jews in Germany because he initiated a petition saying the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was “not in our name.”

However, Katzenstein-Leiterer says that there are now a small group of German Jews who, despite the weight that Germany’s history places on the Jewish community, want to speak out against a Israeli blockade policy – brought in after Hamas took control of the sliver of territory in 2007 – that they see as wrong.

“The whole blockade, the whole siege of Gaza is illegal. It is against international law and human rights,” she says.

“We want to deliver musical instruments and school material. The children and deprived of every kind of school material; clothes, shoes, candies. We don’t see that that is any kind of safety risk.”

On Thursday the Israeli cabinet was expected to make a decision on scrapping the so-called “positive” list of items that they allow into Gaza in favor of a more relaxed “negative” list of prohibited items that could be of use to militants.

“We just see that a Jewish state is occupying Palestine, laying a siege, and depriving children of the things that they need. We as Jews are saying, ‘not in our name.’ We want to show that there are Jews in the world that are on the side of these deprived people,” she says.

a Haaretz.com article

Strike Iran – or sit tight?

Although Prime Minister Netanyahu insists that Israel will not allow Iran to acquire the bomb, it’s not clear Israel can afford to pay the price involved in slowing down Iran by even a few years. But what are the alternatives?

By Yossi Melman
Whoever takes notice of the content and historical context of recent statements made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should be left with no doubt: Iran’s possession of a nuclear bomb will represent an existential threat that the State of Israel will not tolerate. He made remarks in this vein during the central ceremony at Yad Vashem marking Holocaust Remembrance Day in April 2009, a short time after he was sworn into office. “We will not allow Holocaust deniers to carry out a second Holocaust against the Jewish people,” the premier said.

Netanyahu made similar statements at the same ceremony one year later. These words should lead to one obvious conclusion: Israel will do anything in its power – including use of military force – to prevent Iran from obtaining its first nuclear weapon.

The reactor under construction near the Iranian city of Bushehr

Photo by: AFP

On two separate occasions within the last quarter century have Israel Air Force pilots destroyed nuclear facilities in hostile Arab countries in order to prevent those states from acquiring nuclear armaments. The first instance occurred on the Shavuot holiday 29 years ago. On June 7, 1981, a squadron of eight IAF F-16 fighter jets, accompanied by eight other F-15s, attacked the nuclear reactor built by French scientists near Baghdad. Within two minutes, the reactor was destroyed.

The assault was a classic case of preemptive attack, designed to deny the ambitious Saddam Hussein the opportunity of manufacturing a nuclear weapon. This was also the first time in history that one country destroyed a nuclear facility belonging to another country.

The leader who deserves credit for the bold decision is the late prime minister Menachem Begin, who was operating seemingly against all odds. He needed to overcome opposition from ministers in his cabinet, members of the Israel Defense Forces General Staff and senior intelligence officials – all of whom expressed concern over the Arab world’s response and possible international condemnation. Shimon Peres, who at the time was opposition leader and a figure who views himself as the founding father of Israel’s nuclear program, exerted significant efforts to thwart the plan, warning Begin that it would cause Israel to become as isolated in world public opinion as a thistle in the desert.

Acting out of a deep – almost religious – sense of conviction, Begin was not deterred by the naysayers and won approval for the attack in a cabinet vote. As someone whose very being was shaped by the Holocaust, he had often repeated the refrain, “Never again.” Never again will the Jewish people stand before an existential threat. Netanyahu’s statements are like an echo of Begin’s.

In retrospect, after the bombing in Iraq, analysts began to speak of the prime minister’s decision and his steadfast belief in preemption as “the Begin doctrine,” thereby granting it strategic significance. Experts said that essentially this worldview posits that Israel – which is believed by the entire world to possess nuclear weapons – will never permit another country in the Middle East to obtain a nuclear bomb that would threaten its security.

Yet not all are in agreement that the Begin doctrine was born of age-old fears that Israel is at risk of suffering another Holocaust. There are those who believe that this approach was motivated by other factors that have nothing to do with any link between historical context and survival instincts. These skeptics say that Israel will not allow other countries to acquire nuclear weapons simply because it seeks to preserve its nuclear monopoly in the region.

Either way, the Begin doctrine was put to another test 26 years later. In September 2007, IAF pilots successfully destroyed a nuclear reactor on the banks of the Euphrates River, in Syria. It was a facility built by that country, with financial assistance from Iran as well as expertise and know-how from North Korea.

Israel’s image

A number of differences between these two attacks stand out. Prior to the Iraqi incident, Israel did not keep other countries – including the United States, whose president at the time was Ronald Reagan, one of the friendliest leaders Jerusalem has ever had in the White House – abreast of its plans. After the attack, the Israeli government officially announced that its pilots had done the deed. In Syria, the opposite is said to have occurred. Then-prime minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak notified the Americans hours before the strike took place. Since the operation, however, Israel has been vague about its role in the attack, refraining from officially claiming responsibility.

Israel’s image on the world stage is to a large extent a product of these two successful strikes. They created the impression that the IAF in particular, and the Israel Defense Forces in general, are capable of executing any order that is received from the civilian echelon. There are quite a few politicians in Israel, as well as army generals, who have become “prisoners” to this myth. In practice, however, the reality is far more complex and painful.

While the prime minister continues to speak of “Never again” and the defense minister keeps proclaiming that “all options are on the table,” behind the scenes, and in private, both the military and civilian echelons are singing a completely different tune. They grasp the enormous strategic, political, economic and military difficulties that will surely arise in the event of an attack on Iran.

One of the first to embrace a more sober view of the situation is Brig. Gen. (res. ) Relik Shafir, who until recently occupied the third-most important post in the IAF hierarchy, and who in his younger days took part in the attack on the reactor in Iraq. As far back as five years ago, Shafir let me in on the painful truth: The IAF would have great difficulty in repeating its success in Iraq if it were ordered to strike Iran.

“The Iranians have learned the lessons from the attack on the Iraqi reactor,” Shafir said. “In Iraq, the entire nuclear program was concentrated in the reactor. The Iranians on the other hand have built a number of nuclear facilities in different areas around the country. Some of them are located in eastern Iran. They have ‘hardened’ their facilities by building them underground or by placing them in bunkers. In all honesty, the IAF lacks a real strategic capability to bomb distant targets over a prolonged period of time while using the necessary level of firepower.”

Based on research studies by foreign think tanks, including the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, most of the facilities that would apparently be targeted are already known. There is the chemical plant for uranium conversation near the city of Isfahan, the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, another plant in Qom, and perhaps another enrichment facility whose existence has yet to be revealed.

In order for a strike to be effective, then, one would have to deal with a wide variety of targets. While the existence of these targets may be known to intelligence officials in Israel and the West, only a superpower with strategic bombing capability, like the United States, can successfully put them out of commission. Even the former IAF commander and chief of staff Dan Halutz wrote in his memoir, published last fall, that the Iranian nuclear program is a global problem, and that Israel’s prominent role at the forefront of the international effort is of little benefit to solving the problem. According to Halutz, the complexity of the Iranian question requires that other countries endeavor to find a solution.

It is not just former and current air force officers who recognize the difficult set of circumstances. An intimate knowledge of the character and behavior of most members of the national military and political echelons leads one to the conclusion that they too are well aware of the limitations of Israeli might. Netanyahu is considered to be hesitant, and someone who easily panics – traits that might well make it difficult for him to order the IDF to take action. Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, under whose tenures Israel launched the strike on Syria, are considered cautious, responsible leaders who are aware of the enormous differences between the Syrian reactor and the Iranian facilities.

What will Washington say?

More than anything, Israel’s prime consideration in any decision related to national security and existential matters has always been the position of the United States. On nearly every issue related to war and peace, Israel has in the past first tried to determine what Washington would say or do in response. Israel initiated the Six-Day War only after it was made clear to it that the U.S. would not oppose it. Israel refrained from launching a preemptive attack against Egypt in October 1973, even when it was clear that war would erupt within hours, for fear that Washington would blame it for sparking hostilities. Israel invaded Lebanon only after then-defense minister Ariel Sharon understood from statements by then-secretary of state Alexander Haig that the Reagan administration would be able to live with the move.

Hence one is likely to draw the reasonable, logical conclusion that Israel will not attack Iran as long as the Obama administration remains adamantly opposed. And, just to remove any lingering doubt, Washington has taken the trouble to dispatch all of its senior defense officials to Israel to make its position unequivocally clear: Indeed, in the last six months, Israel has hosted Vice President Joe Biden, CIA chief Leon Panetta, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Senator John Kerry, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen. All of these men told Israel’s leaders: “Don’t do it.”

The U.S. and the European Union fear that Iran would retaliate to any strike by attacking American and NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and a special adviser to President Barack Obama, told me that in his view Iran could definitely “make life hell” for U.S. troops in the region. An Israeli bombardment would sow instability in the Middle East, rally Sunni-Muslim support for Shi’ite Iran, and endanger the pro-Western regimes in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain and all the other Arab emirates. An Israeli campaign could also move Iran to block the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow, strategic waterway through which more than one-fourth of the world’s oil supplies flow. Even if the American fleet were ultimately to break through the blockade, it would still send oil prices skyrocketing to unprecedented levels – perhaps as high as $200 a barrel. This, in turn, would foment economic chaos worldwide.

Arab silence

Let us assume that at some point, as a last resort, the American administration changes its mind and gives Israel the green light to carry out its strike against Iran. Will Israel’s leaders have the courage to order such an attack?

In such a scenario, there will be a number of considerations that Israel needs to take into account. The first factor is intelligence. In recent years, there has been an accelerated flow of intelligence information from Iran that has reached Western agencies. What is most striking about the data is its improving quality. More operatives have been enlisted, the methods of technological information-gathering have been refined, senior scientists and generals have been successfully enticed to defect and shed light on the Iranian nuclear program, and there has been harmonious intelligence cooperation between various agencies on the ground. These bodies are so in synch that they have even begun to jointly operate the same agents.

The West has also succeeded in foiling attempts by Iranian straw companies and front groups to purchase equipment – and, alternatively, in selling Iran faulty materials. Details of one such deal emerged in late 2008, during the trial of Iranian businessman Ali Ashtari, an electronics trader who was executed for allegedly spying for the Mossad. Ashtari was accused of selling defective material to Iran so as to “poison” its nuclear program.

Despite the considerable successes that can be credited to the Mossad and its chief, Meir Dagan, the bottom line is that the latter did not fulfill the promise he gave to his civilian superiors when he was named to his post eight years ago: that he would derail Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s efforts to build a bomb continue, albeit at a slow pace, toward its goal.

It is clear to everyone involved in the decision-making process that Israel’s only remaining option is an air force strike combined with the deployment of ground-to-ground missiles, which according to foreign sources would be fired from bases in Israel. Perhaps Israel would also utilize its three Dolphin submarines to launch the missiles.

It appears that the IAF’s capability to carry out the mission successfully is limited, particularly when compared with that of the U.S. Yet before this issue is even considered, one must wrestle with the question of which route it will choose. According to research papers published in recent years in the U.S., there are three possibilities: the southern route, which is the lengthiest, which would entail flying over Saudi Arabia; the central route, which is the shortest distance since it traverses Jordan and Iraq; and the northern route, which runs along the Syrian-Turkish seam line. Each of these options presents advantages and disadvantages that need to be carefully weighed. Planners must also take into account how these routes will affect the quantity and weight of the firearms that could be carried by warplanes (which also depends on whether the planes fly at a high or low altitude ), the logistics of mid-air refueling and, most important, the risk that these jets will be detected and will encounter hostile elements.

‘Bunker busters’

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the number of aircraft that would be able to participate in an assault. According to the same American research, Israel can dispatch no more than 120 fighter jets that would be able to complete a mission to Iran. Ostensibly the number of aircraft also dictates the quantity of armaments they will carry. This is especially significant since the U.S. is refusing to provide Israel with its most advanced, sophisticated munitions, known as “bunker busters.”

One can certainly assume that an Israeli attack on Iran will be carried out with conventional means. Any rational individual needs to understand that if Israel were to use nuclear weapons for offensive purposes rather than self-defense, it would cease to be an accepted member of the community of nations. It would be an outcast even among its supporters. Yet even if IAF jets possessed high-quality conventional arms, would they be adequate to penetrate underground bunkers? And even if the targets are destroyed, the operation’s planners should ask themselves how long it would take for Iran to rebuild them. Is it worth taking all of these risks just to delay Iran’s nuclear program for two to three years? And we have yet to address the issue of the number of pilots and planes that may not make it back from their mission, a question that also needs to be examined by those who are studying the various options.

Here is another consideration that ought to preoccupy the civilian echelon: While most Arab countries are no less concerned than Israel over the possibility that Iran will arm itself with nuclear weapons, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates would not dare express public support for an Israeli assault, let alone allow IAF warplanes to fly over their territories en route to Iran, even if they secretly hope that such a plan comes to fruition. Israel needs to take into account that the Arab regimes, which are liable to clash head-on with the rage of public opinion in their countries, will not only be forced to condemn “Israeli aggression,” but will also be compelled to take practical steps, such as severing diplomatic ties with Jerusalem.

Yet perhaps the most important consideration that the powers-that-be in Israel need to mull is Iran’s response to an attack. In retaliation, Iran would launch Shihab missiles at Israel. It possesses 100 such projectiles. Some of them will not reach their target while others will be intercepted by the Arrow missile defense system, yet a number of them can be expected to hit their intended destination. In addition, Iran will unleash its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, the militant group that boasts thousands of rockets and missiles that can reach most of Israel.

One should also take into account the possibility that Syria, whose missile stockpile significantly dwarfs that of Hezbollah, will also join the hostilities. It is not inconceivable that Hamas would also spring into action to aid its benefactor and patron Iran.

Iran will “awaken” its terrorist sleeper cells worldwide by giving them the green light to attack Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. While the means at Iran’s disposal do not represent an existential threat to Israel, it is highly doubtful that the public here – whose home front has in recent years demonstrated a vulnerability and unwillingness to absorb casualties that is partly spurred on by an increasingly sensationalist media – will be capable of withstanding such a campaign, even if the damage proves to be minimal.

In light of these dangers and the varying uncertainties, the most logical conclusion that can be reached is that Israel’s leadership will find it difficult to come to a final decision to bomb Iran. The significance of this is that Israel will just have to live in the shadow of the Iranian atomic bomb and all of its ramifications. Some Israelis may come to the conclusion that there is no future for them or their children under those circumstances, and thus prefer to emigrate. An Iranian nuclear weapon, after all, could induce Arab states to develop their own atomic bombs, thus ushering in a new era. The Israeli leadership would have to reconcile itself to an arms race in the Middle East.

On the other hand, can the Israeli leadership ever accept such a situation whereby the existence of the state of the Jewish people is dependent on the mercy of a leader with messianic tendencies, a man who has repeatedly claimed that Israel has no right to exist, and that it should be wiped off the map?

Given all of these factors, it is obvious that the question of “to bomb or not to bomb” that stands before the Israeli leadership is one of the most difficult issues in the state’s history. It is no less difficult than David Ben-Gurion’s decision to declare independence in May 1948.

a haaretz.com article

a ca.reuters.com article

A nuclear-armed Iran would blunt Israel’s military autonomy, a wargame involving former Israeli generals and diplomats has concluded, though some players predicted Tehran would also exercise restraint.

Sunday’s event at a campus north of Tel Aviv followed other high-profile Iran simulations in Israel and the United States in recent months. But it broke new ground by assuming the existence of what both countries have pledged to prevent: an Iranian bomb.

“Iranian deterrence proved dizzyingly effective,” Eitan Ben-Eliahu, a retired air force commander who played the Israeli defense minister, said in his summary of the 20-team meeting at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Lauder School of Government.

Though the wargame saw Iran declaring itself a nuclear power in 2011, the ensuing confrontations were by proxy, in Lebanon.

In one, emboldened Hezbollah guerrillas fired missiles at the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv. That was followed by U.S. and Israeli intelligence findings that Iran had slipped radioactive materials to its Lebanese cohort, to assemble a crude device.

Neither move drew Israeli attacks, though Ben-Eliahu said his delegation had received discreet encouragement from Arab rivals of Iran to “go all the way” in retaliating.

Instead, Israel conferred with the United States, which publicly supported its ally’s “right to self-defense” and mobilized military reinforcements for the region while quietly insisting the Israelis stand down to give crisis talks a chance.

“As far as the United States was concerned, Israel was trigger-happy. It sought to use the Hezbollah (missile) attack as justification for what the United States was told would be an all-out war,” said Dan Kurtzer, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel who flew in to play President Barack Obama at the IDC.

Kurtzer voiced satisfaction with his team’s response to the “dirty bomb,” which entailed cajoling U.N. Security Council powers into mounting an armed intervention against Hezbollah.

“Countries like China and Russia have their own terrorists, and don’t want to see them getting nuclear weapons,” he said.

“In certain circumstances, agile U.S. diplomacy can actually work in this region, and it ends up not only leaving Israel in check but it also ends up (with Washington) leading a willing international coalition.”

STRATEGIC BALANCE

Those playing Iran and Hezbollah went as far as to question the very premise that Tehran would let the Lebanese guerrillas goad Israel into a potentially catastrophic fight, or give the nuclear know-how that would worry even sympathizers like Syria.

Aharon Zeevi-Farkash, a retired Israeli intelligence chief acting as Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, insisted Iran would regard its bomb as a means of “self-defense and strategic balance” — an allusion to Israel’s own, assumed atomic arsenal.

Such assessments are seldom voiced by Israel’s rightist government, which describes a nuclear-armed Iran as a mortal danger. Where Israeli officials would once make veiled threats to strike Iran, now they often try to warn the West against accommodating their foe, which denies seeking atomic weapons.

In what appeared to signal government discomfort with the wargame, a senior Israeli defense official who had been due to attend withdrew at short notice. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said a written summary would be studied at government-level.

That left Tzipi Livni, the centrist head of Israel’s opposition, as the most prominent observer of the IDC event.

“As leader of the free world, the United States has the responsibility of leading more effective sanctions that can turn around, absolutely, this shift from a process of stopping (Iran’s nuclear aims) to a process of acceptance,” she said.

While the simulation found no immediate international drive to tackle Iran, Kurtzer attributed this to passive factors such as U.S. war-fatigue. He complained of a failure to address ramifications such as a nuclear arms race among Arab powers.

Some of the participants — including those playing Israel, the Palestinians and Syria — saw an opportunity for renewed Middle East peacemaking that might head off Iran’s ascendancy.

“This was tactical, but of course tactics can often serve real strategic interests, both for us and for the Americans,” said Zalman Shoval, a former Israeli ambassador to Washington, after playing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

haaretz.com article

The missiles are coming
A rational country would have done the arithmetic long ago and understood that by continuing to hold on to the Golan Heights, the chances of a confrontation would simply grow.

Here’s a bit of arithmetic. Take the number of Hezbollah’s Scud missiles and Katyusha rockets and add the number of Iranian-made Zelzal rockets and Shihab-3 missiles, and divide by 7.5 million. How many missiles are there for every Israeli?

And now for geometry. Draw three circles around Tel Aviv; the first will mark the Shihab’s range, the second the Scud’s and the third the Katyusha’s. Assuming that an attack on Israel would be coordinated between Iran, Hezbollah and Syria, would you advise Hezbollah to fire only Scuds and conserve its Katyushas? Or maybe you would advise Iran to fire Shahabs and let Hezbollah conserve its Katyushas? Justify your answers based on your place of residence and the missile range.

The fear rained down on us by Military Intelligence research chief Yossi Baidatz, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (“Hezbollah has more missiles than most governments” ), Jordan’s King Abdullah (“A war could break out this summer” ) and many military analysts leaves Israel with the all-too-familiar feeling that it has no choice but to launch a preemptive attack. Suddenly it turns out that it’s not the Iranian nuclear program that poses an existential threat, but rather the various kinds of missiles. And the terrified country is already preparing public opinion and the army for the next confrontation.

Indeed, there is a balance of terror between Israel and its neighbors, whose purpose is deterrence. That’s what every rational country does when it feels threatened and can’t find a nonmilitary alternative. No doubt, Israel is threatened, but so are Syria, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. It’s enough to listen to Israel’s threats to “take Syria back to the Stone Age,” “destroy Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure” or smash Hamas to understand that the style of the Israeli threat approaches that of Iran. If anyone should be waking up in the morning in a cold sweat, it’s the Lebanese, Syrians and Gazans, not the Israelis.

Nevertheless, even though Syria has suffered military blows from Israel, it continues to act “impudently,” and Lebanon, which was pounded in war, has stepped up its threats. Operation Cast Lead in Gaza did not stop Hamas from arming itself. And in the West Bank, the occupation forces have not completely neutralized the threat.

But unlike Israel, which sees the threat but forgets the catalyst, each of its neighbors has territory under Israeli occupation, each has a legitimate national claim to get its occupied land back. Anyone looking for a nonviolent alternative can find it well-packaged and waiting to be used, but it’s merely getting wet in the rain.

“[Syrian President Bashar] Assad wants peace but doesn’t believe [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu,” Baidatz told the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. But his words were lost in the alarming description of the number of missiles in Hezbollah’s hands. Because even though we understand weapons, and we consider Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah a household name, and we assemble and dismantle centrifuges every day, we lose our way when it comes to the peace process.

Baidatz didn’t explain how it’s possible to gain Assad’s confidence, and he wasn’t asked, just as he wasn’t asked whether returning the Golan Heights to Syria under agreed conditions could neutralize the Syrian-Lebanese-Hezbollah threat. These questions are too dangerous to ask to someone from the army – he just might propose a diplomatic solution.

But it’s possible to answer for him. Peace with Syria might neutralize the military threat from that country, stop Hezbollah from arming and put Iran in a confusing situation, even if it doesn’t break off its relations with Syria. Peace with Syria and the Palestinians would also change Turkey’s position and neutralize the hostility between Israel and the other Arab countries.

In short, the military threat would lose a great deal of its punch. A rational country, even one not seeking peace – and Israel, after all, is not one – would have done the arithmetic long ago and understood that by continuing to hold on to the Golan Heights, the chances of a confrontation would simply grow. It would have understood that the threat does not lie in the circles that mark the missile range but in those territories it continues to occupy.

Charlie Rose – Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Islamic Republic of Iran | May 3, 2010