Analyst: Another Approach Should be Taken to Resolve Israel-Palestinian Conflict

Stephen Kinzer, a journalist and author of the book ‘Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future’

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been visiting Washington and New York. He met with U.S. President Obama and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, to discuss issues, including the Middle East peace process. Mr. Obama said the Israeli leader showed a willingness to engage in serious talks with the Palestinians. Mr. Netanyahu said it was time for direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians to begin.

However, Stephen Kinzer, a journalist and author of the book Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future, which looks at conflict resolution in the Middle East, believes another approach should be taken to resolve the conflict. VOA’s Susan Yackee asked him what new policies the United States could pursue to help stabilize the region.
Kinzer: I start from the idea that our policies are really stuck in the past. We have a policy designed to confront the Middle East of the Cold War, but the Cold War’s been over for more than 20 years and our policy is stuck in the past. So I feel that we need new ideas and creative thinking and “out of the box” approaches to that region. That’s my first conclusion.

The second is, as we approach that region in a new way to try to promote our own interests and the interests of stability in the Middle East, we would be wise to look for partners and not try to do it all ourselves and assume that only we have the good ideas in the Middle East.

And my third is, who would those partners be? If you look around that region and ask yourselves, “Which countries have long-term strategic goals that are similar to ours and also have societies that are similar to ours?” The only two Muslim countries in the Middle East that fulfill those criteria are Turkey, and surprise, Iran. So, I think in the future, in the 21st century, you’re gonna see the emergence of this power triangle: U.S., Turkey, and Iran.

Yackee: But why should the U.S. pursue a partnership with Turkey and Iran?

Kinzer: There are different reasons for the both of them. I think in both cases, you see societies that are open and democratic and eager to engage with the rest of the world. In Iran, you don’t see a government that encourages that but the society in Iran, as I found in my recent visit there last month, is amazingly vibrant and democratic. But over the long run, what about strategic goals? So it’s not a hard sell to say that Turkey and the U.S. have closely linked strategic goals.

After all, we’ve been NATO allies with them for decades. But what about Iran? Isn’t it a little counterfactual to think of the U.S. in a strategic partnership with Iran? I’d suggest this: First of all, Iran has a great ability to stabilize Iraq. They can do more to stabilize Iraq than anyone else, particularly in cooperation with the Turks who have very good ties to the Sunni factions there. So if we want to get out of Iraq, without another explosion of violence there, Iran is a vital partner and also has the great ability to stabilize Afghanistan on the other border.

Iran, of course, has long relations with Afghanistan and a lot of Afghanistan used to be a part of Iran up until Iran lost a few wars in the 19th century. Iran is eager to ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf to the West. Iran is the bitter enemy of radical movements like Taliban and al-Qaeda.

So when you look forward and put aside the prejudices of the moment, you think about state interests, which don’t change when regimes change, you see that Iran’s long-term state interests, along with its vibrantly democratic society, if not government, make it a very intriguing potential partner for the United States.

Yackee: Well, should the U.S. rethink its relationship with Israel?

Kinzer: I think it is right for the U.S. to maintain a long-term strategic partnership with Israel, but when I was in Israel researching this new book I have, I did find a new growing body of opinion in Israel and I think it’s also reflected in the United States. It’s asking themselves, “Are our political leaders able to make decisions that really guard our security over the long run or are we taking steps that seem to defend ourselves right now, but may undermine our security in the long run?”

So, I’d like to see the United States adopt a view that in the long run, Israel is not going to be able to defend itself forever with only military means. The best guarantee for Israel’s long-term security is a calm neighborhood.

Therefore, anything the United States or anyone else from outside the region does in the Middle East that helps stabilize that region and diffuse confrontation is actually good for Israel in the long run.

Yackee: Could Turkey be the arbitrator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Kinzer: I hope so and I fear that the confrontation over Turkey and Israel over this Gaza flotilla in recent weeks might weaken that possibility. That’s a very bad idea. Turkey is caught up in a lot of emotion now, because their citizens were killed on the high seas and there’s a lot of anger about what’s happening in Gaza.

But Turkey should not pick up one of the bad habits of the United States. One of our bad habits is that we make our foreign policy often based on emotion without stopping to think about what’s really in our long-term interests.

Turkey’s in an emotional state about Israel now, but actually the Turkey-Israel relationship is so important for the Middle East. Israel needs a Muslim country as a bridge out of its isolation. Only Turkey can play that role because of its long relationship with Israel. Turkey needs to ratchet down its feelings of anger and confrontation and realize that since it also wants a stable Middle East, it needs to maintain a good relationship with Israel.

To read more click..
Turkey and Iran are Best Strategic Partners for USA in Middle East

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Thursday that the United States must make its position on Israel’s nuclear strategy clear before talks on Tehran’s atomic program could resume.

Sanctions imposed by “arrogant” Western powers would not slow Iran’s nuclear progress, he said.

	Technicians measuring parts of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant in this undated photo.
	Photo by: AP

The United States, Europe and the United Nations have imposed sanctions on Iran over its disputed nuclear program. Iran says its aim is to generate electricity and rejects Western suspicions it is seeking to build a nuclear bomb.

Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator suggested in a letter to the European Union’s foreign affairs chief this week that talks could be held as soon as September on issues including Tehran’s atomic program.

Speaking in Nigeria after a summit of the D8 group of developing nations, Ahmadinejad said Iran supported dialogue but blamed the United States for the failure of previous talks.

Asked what conditions must be met for talks to resume, Ahmadinejad said Washington must make its position on Israel’s nuclear strategy clear.

“The first condition is they should express their views about the nuclear weapons of the Zionist regime. Do they agree with that or not. If they agree that these bombs should be available to them, the course of the dialogue would be different,” he said.

Israel is widely assumed to have the only nuclear arsenal in the region but it refuses to confirm or deny having such weapons. It has usually been spared scrutiny by its guardian ally but the Obama administration alarmed Israel in May by backing an Egyptian initiative for talks in 2012 on a Middle East free of weapons of mass-destruction.

However, hosting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday, U.S. President Barack Obama echoed Israel’s veiled justifications for having the bomb and said Israel had “unique security requirements”.

The White House said Obama had further pledged to keep Israel, which has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, from being “singled out” at a meeting of the U.N. nuclear watchdog in Vienna in September as well as at the Egyptian-proposed regional conference.

Ahmadinejad, speaking to reporters through an interpreter, said the United States must also clarify its own commitment to non-proliferation and its position on its readiness to “resort to force”.

Iran is seeking closer trade ties with Africa and Ahmadinejad laced a speech to Nigerian academic, civil society and religious groups with parallels between African relations with ex-colonial powers and Iran’s own standoff with the West.

“The wealth they stockpiled came from the pockets of others. They have plundered and looted all the mines in Africa. They have plundered the labor force for hundreds of years,” he said.

It was a message that resonated with some of the audience at the gathering in Africa’s most populous nation of 140 million people, roughly equally divided between Christians and Muslims.

“They call the leaders of America leaders of the free world. We call you the leader of nations struggling for freedom,” said Shehu Sani, president of Nigeria’s Civil Rights Congress.

“Dr, Ahmadinejad is a role model, he is an inspiration.”

But Sani also tackled the Iranian leader about his public statements questioning whether the Nazi Holocaust in which six million Jews were killed across Europe had indeed occurred, comments which stirred tensions with Israel.

Ahmadinejad replied: “Why should they occupy the land of the Palestinian people. The people of Palestine committed no crime during World War Two.”

a haaretz.com article

Senators in Jerusalem to discuss Middle East tensions.

There is wide support in Congress for using all means to keep Iran from becoming a nuclear power, “through diplomatic and economic sanctions if we possibly can, through military actions if we must,” visiting US Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) said Wednesday in Jerusalem.

Lieberman, flanked at a Jerusalem press conference by his senate colleagues John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), used very tough language, saying the words “military action” in regards to stopping Iran’s nuclear program. Most US officials opt to tiptoe around the subject, saying “no options are off the table.”

Lieberman said that “a certain trumpet needs to sounded here for the Iranian regime to hear.”

He said the sanctions Congress recently passed against Iran were meant to signal to Teheran to “negotiate the end of their nuclear program and re-entry into the civilized world, if that is possible. But if not, they should know that when Congress says it is unacceptable to get nuclear weapons, we mean it. We hope economic and diplomatic power will work, but if we must use force, that must remain a very active option.”

Regarding Tuesday’s friendly meeting in Washington between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and US President Barack Obama, Lieberman – based on reports he heard from people there – said “it was a positive meeting, and we can say with some encouragement that the relationship between the US and Israel is back on track.”

Lieberman, acknowledging that the past year was a “difficult one” in the US-Israel relationship, said that even during this period “the members of Congress across party lines continued to both feel and express strong support for the security of the State of Israel, and for the relationship.”

Graham was even blunter.

“The Congress has Israel’s back,” he said, “and never misunderstand that. Whatever relationship problems we have had in the past, it has never seeped over into Congress. The Congress has been united in protection of one of our best allies in the world, the State of Israel.”

Regarding another American ally, Turkey, McCain – referring to both Ankara’s vote against Iran sanctions at the UN and its hostile rhetoric toward Israel – said he has been “disappointed recently” by Turkey’s “actions and words.”

At the same time, he said, Turkey is an old and close ally with whom the US has common interests.

“I hope that at some point the Turkish leadership would lower the rhetoric, reduce it to the point where we can try to solve differences in a quiet and diplomatic way,” McCain said.

Asked what would happen to US-Turkish ties if Ankara severed, as it has threatened to do, its ties with Israel, McCain replied, “obviously it wouldn’t be helpful. I hope this won’t be the case. I hope that there will be conversations.” Saying that the Israeli-Turkish relationship has “contributed to stability in the Middle East,” McCain said he found the situation “disturbing,” and said he hoped the US could play an “interlocutor role to bridge some of these differences.”

Fundamentally, McCain said, Turkey remains a secular nation that has “contributed enormously to peace in the region and the world.”

All three senators, who met during their two-day stay with Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, as well as with Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, praised the US-trained PA security forces.

McCain, in an apparent reference to talk about putting PA security forces at border crossings from Israel into Gaza, said the willingness of Israel to discuss this issue showed the confidence Israel had in these forces as well.

 a jpost article

The Israeli navy was today preparing to confront a flotilla of eight ships carrying hundreds of pro-Palestinian activists and 10,000 tons of aid which is attempting to break the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip.

The flotilla is expected to head towards the Gaza coastline tomorrow. The Israeli military has declared its intention to block the flotilla’s progress as soon as it attempts to cross from international waters into the 20-mile exclusion zone Israel maintains off Gaza’s coast.

The military declined to confirm a report in the Israeli daily Ma’ariv detailing a five-point plan for the confrontation, including warnings, takeover by force, and the detention and deportation of the activists on board.

A temporary detention centre has been established in the Israeli port of Ashdod, 23 miles north of Gaza City, where officials will reportedly offer activists the choice between immediate deportation to their country of origin or being bussed to jails across the country while a legal process to expel them takes its course.

Greta Berlin of the Free Gaza Movement, one of the organisations behind the flotilla, indicated today that most of those on board would refuse to comply with the Israeli authorities.

She said: “We are committed to getting into Gaza. We expect a standoff at sea.”

The activists were braced for a violent confrontation, said Berlin, pointing to a previous incident in December 2008 when a similar attempt to reach Gaza by sea ended in the activists’ boat being rammed by the Israeli navy.

She claimed the navy was attempting to stop the eight boats converging into a flotilla by threatening to attack one of their number, a Turkish passenger ship carrying around 650 people. “They’re going to try to pick us off one by one,” she said. Israel had jammed satellite phones and radars on board the ships, she claimed.

However, an Israeli military spokesman said there had been no contact between the navy and the activists. “We’re waiting to see what happens – it depends on how things proceed,” he said.

The Ma’ariv report said the military feared that there could be “terror activists”, explosives and weapons on board the ships.

Berlin denied this, saying every item on board each ship had been inspected by port authorities and manifests issued. “Yet the Israelis are coming towards us armed to the teeth.”

As well as the prospect of a physical confrontation, a propaganda war between Israel and the activists was well under way today.

Avigdor Lieberman, Israel’s foreign minister, said the flotilla was “an attempt at violent propaganda against Israel, and Israel will not allow a violation of its sovereignty at sea, in the air, or on land.”

He added: “There is no humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and despite the Hamas leadership’s war crimes and rocket fire, Israel is conducting itself in the most humanitarian manner, and is allowing the entrance of thousands of tons of food and equipment into Gaza.”

However, the UN and other aid organisations have repeatedly pointed to the devastating impact of the acute shortage of construction materials to rebuild homes and infrastructure following the 2008-9 war, as well as restrictions on foods, medical equipment and school supplies allowed into Gaza.
To read more click: Israeli navy prepares for action as activists’ flotilla nears Gaza

The Region: Why sanction Iran, you ask?
By BARRY RUBIN

More sanctions won’t stop the Islamic Republic’s quest for nuclear power, but there are other reasons for imposing them.

Since the Middle East is so important nowadays, it’s a pity that a lot of people – including policy-makers and opinion-makers – don’t understand some basic concepts about the region. So let’s try to explain these things to them.

What is the use, at least potentially, of sanctions on Iran? We all know that any sanctions the US government, or even the world, is likely to apply won’t stop Iran’s nuclear program. But there are many other potential goals for imposing sanctions. These include: making it harder for Iran to build these weapons and the missiles to carry them, slowing down the program, reducing Iran’s economic assets which can be used for military spending, denying Iran other weapons, intimidating Iran into greater caution in its actual behavior and encouraging factions (both within the establishment and in the opposition) to conclude that the current regime is leading them to disaster and must be displaced.

Of these six goals, the current sanctions plan largely accomplishes one of them – barring the sale of most conventional weapons (but not anti-aircraft missiles) – and does a small amount toward reducing Iran’s assets and slowing down the project. In general, though, it is a question of too little too late.

Again, the problem is not that the sanctions proposed (and which might still be watered down further) aren’t so huge as to make Iran stop but that they will not make Iran more cautious, promote internal conflict due to their high cost or really increase economic pressure to reduce military spending.

SHOULD THE world stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons? In principle, the answer is yes, but we now know that this will not happen. The task, then, is to prepare for a strong containment strategy, which is also not happening.

The US government seems to believe that “declaring” containment – saying for example, “if Teheran gives nuclear weapons to terrorists, we will do something,” “if it attacks a neighbor, we will do something” – is sufficient at a time when US credibility and deterrence is at an all-time low.

Why did Russia and China agree to the sanctions plan? Because it doesn’t stop them from doing everything they want, with the exception of selling conventional weapons to Iran (which they might smuggle into the country anyway).

How do we know that US credibility and deterrence power is at an all-time low due to the current policy of “proud weakness” by the Obama administration? Take a look at Lebanon, for example. Former champions of Lebanese sovereignty against Hizbullah, Iran and Syria, now rush to Damascus to pledge allegiance to the Syrian dictatorship. US leaders also don’t notice the defection of the Turkish regime to the other side. Even with Brazil, despite Obama’s lavish praise for that country’s radical president, Teheran’s view counted more than that of Washington.

There are many articles in Arabic-language newspapers and other sources about how they feel the US is too weak and undependable as a protector. Simultaneously, there are growing moves to appease Syria and Iran.

Is the concept of Iran using nuclear weapons as a “defensive umbrella” for aggression a viable one? Absolutely. Having nuclear weapons will make Iran “untouchable” in terms of retaliation. We already see this on a smaller scale with North Korea and Pakistan. North Korea is so confident that it torpedoed and sank a South Korean ship, knowing that its adversary can do nothing about it. That regime also ignores all the requests, demands and pressures on it to change its behavior even though its people are on the edge of starvation.

Pakistan is a stronger case. It has in the recent past seized Indian territory and continues to sponsor a full-scale terrorist war on India, knowing New Delhi has no military option. Since the bloody assault on Mumbai, Pakistan has done nothing and India is helpless to do anything.

This is all on a small scale compared to Iran’s capabilities, assets and ambitions. The strategic idea is that Iran will not actually fire nuclear weapons but having them gives it huge prestige that will help recruit thousands of Muslims in other countries into its client organizations, and intimidate the West and Arabic-speaking states into passivity or active appeasement.

SHOULD ISRAEL attack Iranian nuclear installations? I lean toward a no on this question for a number of reasons. We know that such an operation would not destroy Iran’s ability to rebuild its capability, or might not even damage it significantly. Too much can go wrong with the attack itself.

Moreover, Israel lacks the minimal international support for such an attack. I don’t mean Israel cannot do it, but on a cost-benefit basis – and in military operations one cannot assume everything will go right – the strategy doesn’t seem a good bet. All that is only true, of course, if Israeli assessments are that Iran is not going to attack Israel. And if those assessments ever change, then such an operation should be launched.

No one should underestimate the value of Israel’s own defensive system, which can be especially effective against the very small number of missiles Iran could launch even if it did decide to attack.

This analysis does not assume a nuclear Iran will not pose a huge and actual threat, but that the main problem is for Arabic-speaking states having to protect themselves from Iranian intimidation and subversion. It is also for the US having to create a credible system of containment. But the real burden for meeting this challenge is not for Israel.

The other countries of the world are going to have to learn for themselves the enormous mistake of failing to stop Iran and cheering the weakening of the United States. At that point, they are more likely to listen to reason. They are more likely to do this if they cannot depend on Israel to “save” them.

a jpost.com article

Iran’s safety belt
The agreement signed last week between Iran, Turkey and Brazil to exchange Tehran’s enriched uranium for nuclear fuel does not alter the reality or dull the threat posed by Iran. It does, however, represent a fascinating lesson in managing foreign affairs.

By Zvi Bar’el
The agreement signed last week between Iran, Turkey and Brazil to exchange Tehran’s enriched uranium for nuclear fuel does not alter the reality or dull the threat posed by Iran. It does, however, represent a fascinating lesson in managing foreign affairs.

In October 2009, when it was proposed that Iran replace its enriched uranium stockpile with nuclear fuel rods, no one publicly demanded that the exchange be conditioned on Iran ceasing to enrich uranium independently. The plan was described as a confidence-building measure and called for Iran to transfer 75 percent of its uranium enriched at 3.5 percent to Russia and France. In exchange they would deliver to Iran, within a year, 120 kilograms of nuclear fuel for Iran’s research reactors.

The quantities were based on estimates that Iran had 1,200 kilograms of uranium, and that removing 700 to 800 kilograms of it from its territory would prevent Tehran from building a nuclear warhead (which requires much higher levels of enrichment ). The Western proposal aimed to test just how serious Iran had been in declaring that it had no intention to develop nuclear arms. It also sought to buy time to conduct negotiations regarding Iran’s complete cessation of nuclear enrichment.

Iran rejected the proposal and continued enriching uranium. The current assessment is that it holds close to 2,300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium, meaning that even if 1,200 kilograms of uranium is removed from its territory, it still has enough to enrich to weapons-grade levels that can be used to build a nuclear warhead. This explains Iran’s willingness to transfer to Turkey the amount of uranium that has been demanded by Western powers. However, the West now says the deal with Turkey will not put an end to Iran’s uranium enrichment – which had been the flaw in its proposal in the first place. What made these countries, led by the United States, oppose this deal and present a draft of new sanctions, as if it were punishment for the flawed deal with Turkey?

We can assume that had Iran accepted the Western proposal, thereby signing on to the same things agreed on in the deal with Turkey, the world would have been thrilled, praising Barack Obama’s diplomatic skills and describing Iran’s surrender to Western pressure as a miracle.

Except the Iranian regime decided to grant the “diplomatic gift” to Turkey and Brazil, not the United States – that’s why there has been an outrage. The Islamic Republic avoided “surrendering” to Washington, determined the terms of the agreement itself and bolstered the standing of its friends. The Iranian regime also placed a dilemma before the United States and its partners, who rushed to fall straight into the trap.

Instead of accepting the deal between Iran and Turkey – whereby a quantity of uranium that Washington had sought but failed to remove from Iran’s stockpile would be pulled out – and continuing to threaten sanctions unless Iran ceased to enrich uranium, a new proposal is being formulated whose goals will not likely be achieved and which may torpedo the agreement with Turkey. This new proposal will not prevent the huge Chinese and Russian investments in Iran, or include the Central Bank of Iran on the list of boycotted financial institutions. In the best-case scenario, the U.S. initiative grants Europe the leverage to impose its own sanctions that are tougher than those enacted by the United Nations.

These sanctions are too weak to make Iran reverse its decision to develop nuclear technology, but they do constitute, from Tehran’s perspective, yet another protective layer against a military strike against it, as the new measures must be given time to work. How long until Iran has a nuclear weapon? Until it has sufficient uranium to build a nuclear weapon? This is the problem with sanctions – defining their goals can be confusing.

The more problematic result of these events is that after the blow Obama struck at the exchange deal, it is doubtful whether there is room for any sort of dialogue between him and the Iranian regime. Israel is of course pleased with the turn of events, but this is the first time Iran withdrew from the red lines it had set a few months ago. It is willing to transfer its uranium to another state, it is not insisting that the transfer be done in stages, and it wants full dialogue – on all issues – with the international community. Lacking any other worthy alternative, there is no reason not to try out the Turkish option.

a haaretz.com article

Strike Iran – or sit tight?

Although Prime Minister Netanyahu insists that Israel will not allow Iran to acquire the bomb, it’s not clear Israel can afford to pay the price involved in slowing down Iran by even a few years. But what are the alternatives?

By Yossi Melman
Whoever takes notice of the content and historical context of recent statements made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should be left with no doubt: Iran’s possession of a nuclear bomb will represent an existential threat that the State of Israel will not tolerate. He made remarks in this vein during the central ceremony at Yad Vashem marking Holocaust Remembrance Day in April 2009, a short time after he was sworn into office. “We will not allow Holocaust deniers to carry out a second Holocaust against the Jewish people,” the premier said.

Netanyahu made similar statements at the same ceremony one year later. These words should lead to one obvious conclusion: Israel will do anything in its power – including use of military force – to prevent Iran from obtaining its first nuclear weapon.

The reactor under construction near the Iranian city of Bushehr

Photo by: AFP

On two separate occasions within the last quarter century have Israel Air Force pilots destroyed nuclear facilities in hostile Arab countries in order to prevent those states from acquiring nuclear armaments. The first instance occurred on the Shavuot holiday 29 years ago. On June 7, 1981, a squadron of eight IAF F-16 fighter jets, accompanied by eight other F-15s, attacked the nuclear reactor built by French scientists near Baghdad. Within two minutes, the reactor was destroyed.

The assault was a classic case of preemptive attack, designed to deny the ambitious Saddam Hussein the opportunity of manufacturing a nuclear weapon. This was also the first time in history that one country destroyed a nuclear facility belonging to another country.

The leader who deserves credit for the bold decision is the late prime minister Menachem Begin, who was operating seemingly against all odds. He needed to overcome opposition from ministers in his cabinet, members of the Israel Defense Forces General Staff and senior intelligence officials – all of whom expressed concern over the Arab world’s response and possible international condemnation. Shimon Peres, who at the time was opposition leader and a figure who views himself as the founding father of Israel’s nuclear program, exerted significant efforts to thwart the plan, warning Begin that it would cause Israel to become as isolated in world public opinion as a thistle in the desert.

Acting out of a deep – almost religious – sense of conviction, Begin was not deterred by the naysayers and won approval for the attack in a cabinet vote. As someone whose very being was shaped by the Holocaust, he had often repeated the refrain, “Never again.” Never again will the Jewish people stand before an existential threat. Netanyahu’s statements are like an echo of Begin’s.

In retrospect, after the bombing in Iraq, analysts began to speak of the prime minister’s decision and his steadfast belief in preemption as “the Begin doctrine,” thereby granting it strategic significance. Experts said that essentially this worldview posits that Israel – which is believed by the entire world to possess nuclear weapons – will never permit another country in the Middle East to obtain a nuclear bomb that would threaten its security.

Yet not all are in agreement that the Begin doctrine was born of age-old fears that Israel is at risk of suffering another Holocaust. There are those who believe that this approach was motivated by other factors that have nothing to do with any link between historical context and survival instincts. These skeptics say that Israel will not allow other countries to acquire nuclear weapons simply because it seeks to preserve its nuclear monopoly in the region.

Either way, the Begin doctrine was put to another test 26 years later. In September 2007, IAF pilots successfully destroyed a nuclear reactor on the banks of the Euphrates River, in Syria. It was a facility built by that country, with financial assistance from Iran as well as expertise and know-how from North Korea.

Israel’s image

A number of differences between these two attacks stand out. Prior to the Iraqi incident, Israel did not keep other countries – including the United States, whose president at the time was Ronald Reagan, one of the friendliest leaders Jerusalem has ever had in the White House – abreast of its plans. After the attack, the Israeli government officially announced that its pilots had done the deed. In Syria, the opposite is said to have occurred. Then-prime minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak notified the Americans hours before the strike took place. Since the operation, however, Israel has been vague about its role in the attack, refraining from officially claiming responsibility.

Israel’s image on the world stage is to a large extent a product of these two successful strikes. They created the impression that the IAF in particular, and the Israel Defense Forces in general, are capable of executing any order that is received from the civilian echelon. There are quite a few politicians in Israel, as well as army generals, who have become “prisoners” to this myth. In practice, however, the reality is far more complex and painful.

While the prime minister continues to speak of “Never again” and the defense minister keeps proclaiming that “all options are on the table,” behind the scenes, and in private, both the military and civilian echelons are singing a completely different tune. They grasp the enormous strategic, political, economic and military difficulties that will surely arise in the event of an attack on Iran.

One of the first to embrace a more sober view of the situation is Brig. Gen. (res. ) Relik Shafir, who until recently occupied the third-most important post in the IAF hierarchy, and who in his younger days took part in the attack on the reactor in Iraq. As far back as five years ago, Shafir let me in on the painful truth: The IAF would have great difficulty in repeating its success in Iraq if it were ordered to strike Iran.

“The Iranians have learned the lessons from the attack on the Iraqi reactor,” Shafir said. “In Iraq, the entire nuclear program was concentrated in the reactor. The Iranians on the other hand have built a number of nuclear facilities in different areas around the country. Some of them are located in eastern Iran. They have ‘hardened’ their facilities by building them underground or by placing them in bunkers. In all honesty, the IAF lacks a real strategic capability to bomb distant targets over a prolonged period of time while using the necessary level of firepower.”

Based on research studies by foreign think tanks, including the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, most of the facilities that would apparently be targeted are already known. There is the chemical plant for uranium conversation near the city of Isfahan, the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, another plant in Qom, and perhaps another enrichment facility whose existence has yet to be revealed.

In order for a strike to be effective, then, one would have to deal with a wide variety of targets. While the existence of these targets may be known to intelligence officials in Israel and the West, only a superpower with strategic bombing capability, like the United States, can successfully put them out of commission. Even the former IAF commander and chief of staff Dan Halutz wrote in his memoir, published last fall, that the Iranian nuclear program is a global problem, and that Israel’s prominent role at the forefront of the international effort is of little benefit to solving the problem. According to Halutz, the complexity of the Iranian question requires that other countries endeavor to find a solution.

It is not just former and current air force officers who recognize the difficult set of circumstances. An intimate knowledge of the character and behavior of most members of the national military and political echelons leads one to the conclusion that they too are well aware of the limitations of Israeli might. Netanyahu is considered to be hesitant, and someone who easily panics – traits that might well make it difficult for him to order the IDF to take action. Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, under whose tenures Israel launched the strike on Syria, are considered cautious, responsible leaders who are aware of the enormous differences between the Syrian reactor and the Iranian facilities.

What will Washington say?

More than anything, Israel’s prime consideration in any decision related to national security and existential matters has always been the position of the United States. On nearly every issue related to war and peace, Israel has in the past first tried to determine what Washington would say or do in response. Israel initiated the Six-Day War only after it was made clear to it that the U.S. would not oppose it. Israel refrained from launching a preemptive attack against Egypt in October 1973, even when it was clear that war would erupt within hours, for fear that Washington would blame it for sparking hostilities. Israel invaded Lebanon only after then-defense minister Ariel Sharon understood from statements by then-secretary of state Alexander Haig that the Reagan administration would be able to live with the move.

Hence one is likely to draw the reasonable, logical conclusion that Israel will not attack Iran as long as the Obama administration remains adamantly opposed. And, just to remove any lingering doubt, Washington has taken the trouble to dispatch all of its senior defense officials to Israel to make its position unequivocally clear: Indeed, in the last six months, Israel has hosted Vice President Joe Biden, CIA chief Leon Panetta, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Senator John Kerry, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen. All of these men told Israel’s leaders: “Don’t do it.”

The U.S. and the European Union fear that Iran would retaliate to any strike by attacking American and NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and a special adviser to President Barack Obama, told me that in his view Iran could definitely “make life hell” for U.S. troops in the region. An Israeli bombardment would sow instability in the Middle East, rally Sunni-Muslim support for Shi’ite Iran, and endanger the pro-Western regimes in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain and all the other Arab emirates. An Israeli campaign could also move Iran to block the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow, strategic waterway through which more than one-fourth of the world’s oil supplies flow. Even if the American fleet were ultimately to break through the blockade, it would still send oil prices skyrocketing to unprecedented levels – perhaps as high as $200 a barrel. This, in turn, would foment economic chaos worldwide.

Arab silence

Let us assume that at some point, as a last resort, the American administration changes its mind and gives Israel the green light to carry out its strike against Iran. Will Israel’s leaders have the courage to order such an attack?

In such a scenario, there will be a number of considerations that Israel needs to take into account. The first factor is intelligence. In recent years, there has been an accelerated flow of intelligence information from Iran that has reached Western agencies. What is most striking about the data is its improving quality. More operatives have been enlisted, the methods of technological information-gathering have been refined, senior scientists and generals have been successfully enticed to defect and shed light on the Iranian nuclear program, and there has been harmonious intelligence cooperation between various agencies on the ground. These bodies are so in synch that they have even begun to jointly operate the same agents.

The West has also succeeded in foiling attempts by Iranian straw companies and front groups to purchase equipment – and, alternatively, in selling Iran faulty materials. Details of one such deal emerged in late 2008, during the trial of Iranian businessman Ali Ashtari, an electronics trader who was executed for allegedly spying for the Mossad. Ashtari was accused of selling defective material to Iran so as to “poison” its nuclear program.

Despite the considerable successes that can be credited to the Mossad and its chief, Meir Dagan, the bottom line is that the latter did not fulfill the promise he gave to his civilian superiors when he was named to his post eight years ago: that he would derail Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s efforts to build a bomb continue, albeit at a slow pace, toward its goal.

It is clear to everyone involved in the decision-making process that Israel’s only remaining option is an air force strike combined with the deployment of ground-to-ground missiles, which according to foreign sources would be fired from bases in Israel. Perhaps Israel would also utilize its three Dolphin submarines to launch the missiles.

It appears that the IAF’s capability to carry out the mission successfully is limited, particularly when compared with that of the U.S. Yet before this issue is even considered, one must wrestle with the question of which route it will choose. According to research papers published in recent years in the U.S., there are three possibilities: the southern route, which is the lengthiest, which would entail flying over Saudi Arabia; the central route, which is the shortest distance since it traverses Jordan and Iraq; and the northern route, which runs along the Syrian-Turkish seam line. Each of these options presents advantages and disadvantages that need to be carefully weighed. Planners must also take into account how these routes will affect the quantity and weight of the firearms that could be carried by warplanes (which also depends on whether the planes fly at a high or low altitude ), the logistics of mid-air refueling and, most important, the risk that these jets will be detected and will encounter hostile elements.

‘Bunker busters’

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the number of aircraft that would be able to participate in an assault. According to the same American research, Israel can dispatch no more than 120 fighter jets that would be able to complete a mission to Iran. Ostensibly the number of aircraft also dictates the quantity of armaments they will carry. This is especially significant since the U.S. is refusing to provide Israel with its most advanced, sophisticated munitions, known as “bunker busters.”

One can certainly assume that an Israeli attack on Iran will be carried out with conventional means. Any rational individual needs to understand that if Israel were to use nuclear weapons for offensive purposes rather than self-defense, it would cease to be an accepted member of the community of nations. It would be an outcast even among its supporters. Yet even if IAF jets possessed high-quality conventional arms, would they be adequate to penetrate underground bunkers? And even if the targets are destroyed, the operation’s planners should ask themselves how long it would take for Iran to rebuild them. Is it worth taking all of these risks just to delay Iran’s nuclear program for two to three years? And we have yet to address the issue of the number of pilots and planes that may not make it back from their mission, a question that also needs to be examined by those who are studying the various options.

Here is another consideration that ought to preoccupy the civilian echelon: While most Arab countries are no less concerned than Israel over the possibility that Iran will arm itself with nuclear weapons, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates would not dare express public support for an Israeli assault, let alone allow IAF warplanes to fly over their territories en route to Iran, even if they secretly hope that such a plan comes to fruition. Israel needs to take into account that the Arab regimes, which are liable to clash head-on with the rage of public opinion in their countries, will not only be forced to condemn “Israeli aggression,” but will also be compelled to take practical steps, such as severing diplomatic ties with Jerusalem.

Yet perhaps the most important consideration that the powers-that-be in Israel need to mull is Iran’s response to an attack. In retaliation, Iran would launch Shihab missiles at Israel. It possesses 100 such projectiles. Some of them will not reach their target while others will be intercepted by the Arrow missile defense system, yet a number of them can be expected to hit their intended destination. In addition, Iran will unleash its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, the militant group that boasts thousands of rockets and missiles that can reach most of Israel.

One should also take into account the possibility that Syria, whose missile stockpile significantly dwarfs that of Hezbollah, will also join the hostilities. It is not inconceivable that Hamas would also spring into action to aid its benefactor and patron Iran.

Iran will “awaken” its terrorist sleeper cells worldwide by giving them the green light to attack Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. While the means at Iran’s disposal do not represent an existential threat to Israel, it is highly doubtful that the public here – whose home front has in recent years demonstrated a vulnerability and unwillingness to absorb casualties that is partly spurred on by an increasingly sensationalist media – will be capable of withstanding such a campaign, even if the damage proves to be minimal.

In light of these dangers and the varying uncertainties, the most logical conclusion that can be reached is that Israel’s leadership will find it difficult to come to a final decision to bomb Iran. The significance of this is that Israel will just have to live in the shadow of the Iranian atomic bomb and all of its ramifications. Some Israelis may come to the conclusion that there is no future for them or their children under those circumstances, and thus prefer to emigrate. An Iranian nuclear weapon, after all, could induce Arab states to develop their own atomic bombs, thus ushering in a new era. The Israeli leadership would have to reconcile itself to an arms race in the Middle East.

On the other hand, can the Israeli leadership ever accept such a situation whereby the existence of the state of the Jewish people is dependent on the mercy of a leader with messianic tendencies, a man who has repeatedly claimed that Israel has no right to exist, and that it should be wiped off the map?

Given all of these factors, it is obvious that the question of “to bomb or not to bomb” that stands before the Israeli leadership is one of the most difficult issues in the state’s history. It is no less difficult than David Ben-Gurion’s decision to declare independence in May 1948.

a haaretz.com article

Why China can be a game-changer in the ME
By AVRUM EHRLICH

Several decades of US failure to bring peace to the region has not prompted the sages of Israeli diplomacy to consider other tracks.

At an Iran crisis simulation exercise held at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya (IDC) this week, a star-studded cast of ambassadors, former generals, experts and professors representing state and non-state actors played out the “responses” to a flare up between Iran and Israel. I was asked to play the Chinese position in such a scenario, affording a front-row view of some of the worryingly outdated attitudes of the Israeli (and American) participants. It was embarrassing to observe how out of touch the players were with the fast-changing geo-political and economic fault lines underscoring the tensions. It was also concerning that all seemed to misunderstand, did not care enough to understand, or chose to ignore Chinese interests and influence in Iran and the Middle East.

Consumed by an almost drug-induced US-centric psychosis and unshakeable faith in the infallibility of a US-led track, several decades of failure to bring about a Middle East game-changer has not prompted the sages of Israeli diplomacy to review its veracity or consider other options and tracks.

Despite the incredible energy Israelis spend on integrating with the American consensus – sending students to Harvard and MIT, scholarly hob knobbing and shoulder rubbing with policy institute doyens in Washington and political back scrubbing – no such efforts (or even signs of interest) are invested in developing relations with China.

Israel has become bound in the service of US conceptual frameworks, while not understanding the nuances of others and the fault lines of other geo-political and economic realities.

No alternative horizons or different models of thinking are proposed by the iconoclastic Israeli strategist. The prospect that a home-grown Asian entity, the emerging economic giant, a local resident to the continent, could actually play an important role in resolving a regional problem, has not occurred to the brilliant Israeli political adviser.

FOR THOSE who don’t have time to read more, suffice to internalize a short message. China’s role in resolving the Middle East stalemate is overlooked as if it didn’t exist. Perhaps so many political advisers have their careers built on the Israel-American relationship, they are loathe to kick a ball over to the Chinese court. China’s influence over Iran and the Arab world is many times greater than that of the US: It has massive, unprecedented investments, hundreds of thousands of workers, engineers and professionals on the ground. China consumes and underwrites a huge percentage of the ME and Iranian GDP.

Iranian and Arab world economies are dependent on China’s continued engagement. Impressive, regular and high-level exchanges between these countries are continuous. Thousands of students, delegations, trade and investment groups travel between countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Pakistan, Lebanon, Egypt and so on. China does not like to acknowledge the full extent of its influence in the region because of the obvious ramifications this would have on its international obligations if it were recognized as a Middle East game changer.

Furthermore, attention must be paid to how to steer China’s interest toward reconciling the problems in the region instead of benefiting from them, as it does at present.

I was asked by several parties at the simulation exercise to vote in favor of regional peace – something which, despite all good will, I could not do, because peace and stability in the region were designed to bring maximum benefit to the US and reduce those of other national players.

At present, China is cherry-picking the oil, gas and resource deals while selling its goods to a captive market.

Unless Israel understands Chinese interests and decides to design a situation where China can benefit from regional stability and cooperation, it cannot expect to bring the country over as a partner to its vision. This work must be done by Israel alone. It cannot expect the Americans to understand that Israel’s interests may lie elsewhere.

A short example of how Israel can work with China for regional stability is demonstrated in the recently reported expression of interest from Doha to reestablish diplomatic relations in return for rights to rebuild Gaza. Constructing a Chinese-Israeli-Arab understanding for large construction and infrastructure programs across the ME may be of sufficient interest to the Chinese for them to use their influence to halt tensions between the parties. The reconstruction of Gaza is an excellent opportunity to bring them in.

It is time for policy-makers to wake up to some conceptual game changes which have taken place in the world over the last decade. It’s time we turn our thoughts to carefully constructing Israeli policy towards China.
a JPost.com article